Herbert McCabe on the sesquiguous

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Herbert McCabe on the sesquiguous I should, perhaps, introduce here my invention of the sesquiguous, which lies between the ambiguous and the plonking or flat statement. The plonking statement is one-dimensional, clear, unarguable and unimportant: in theological terms it belongs to the pre-conciliar world of what were thought of as clarities and certainties. The ambiguous statement on the […]

Recent Readings in Philosophy

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The following are just some recent philosophy titles that have caught my eye lately. These are the sorts of projects I try to track, so I thought I’d flag some of them down for any others whose interests might overlap with mine. If I can manage to find the time, I’ll provide some additional annotations for a few of these works (they really do deserve better promotions than I’m offering at the moment). For now though, unfortunately, just links will have to suffice — for those that’d care for more info. I will say this though, I’m pleased to see the amount of attention being paid to the burgeoning branch of philosophy getting labeled metaphilosophy. Practically overnight it has overtaken what I previously took to be my interest in epistemology.

Book Notice: Donald MacKinnon

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Though perhaps not as widely engaged as his thought warrants, Donald M. MacKinnon (1913-1994) has nevertheless left an indelible mark on contemporary theology. This oversight in theological literature may just be due to MacKinnon’s preference for occasional forms of writing. Whatever the reason may be, though, if you’re an avid reader of theology, it would be a curious circumstance if you haven’t encountered at least one of his students before. To name just a few, MacKinnon’s pupils included Nicholas Lash, Fergus Kerr, Rowan Williams, Sarah Coakley, David Ford, Frances Young, and John Webster. An impressive roll call, to say the least, and not a trivial reflection of MacKinnon’s legacy. This is why the release of Philosophy and the Burden of Theological Honesty: A Donald MacKinnon Reader, Ed., John McDowell, (T&T Clark, 2011) may be hoped to contribute to a retrieval of MacKinnon of sorts. This anthology collects 30 selections spanning 54 years of MacKinnon’s publishing career, from 1941-1995. Its contents, much like MacKinnon’s interests, evince a staggering breadth. If that’s not enough, however, and your curiosity still isn’t piqued, let me leave you with a taste of MacKinnon’s prose:

 There is no escape at any point in life from the fear that our very seriousness about ourselves is sound and fury signifying nothing. The medieval schoolmen would have said: inevitably so, for man is poised between being and not being; he draws his existence wholly from the self-existent God. The movement of human thought must reflect man’s situation in being. Because he is so poised between being and not-being, he will never see his experience as something assured. Again and again, in tacking stock of himself, he will not find easily the arguments which will assure him that his standing is secure. At their wisest the schoolmen would never allow that by a formula we could somehow escape the most fundamental conditions of our existence. In the end they would have said: the proof of the pudding is in the eating; a necessary implication of their insistence on the primacy of being over thought. And perhaps we must say the same. There is no other proof possible that a seriousness in life is justified than is found in living. One cannot by any magic escape the conditions of humanity, assume the absolute perspective of God. If it is better to arrive than to travel, we are still inescapably travelling in statu viae, to use the old phrase. And our perspectives are necessarily those of travellers, at least for most of the time. But there still remains a difference between the traveller who takes the measure of his road and the one who seeks to be oblivious of its windings. (310-11)

And for those especially curious about MacKinnon, here’s a sampling of additional works to consider:

Primary Sources

  • Borderlands of Theology: And Other Essays, Re-issued Ed., (Wipf&Stock, 2011).
  • Explorations in Theology, Vol 5: Donald MacKinnon, (SCM, 1979).
  • Themes in Theology, The Threefold Cord: essays in Philosophy, Politics, and Theology, (T&T Clark, 1987).

Secondary

  • The Philosophical frontiers of Christian Theology: Essays Presented to D.M. MacKinnon, Eds., Brian Hebblethwaite and Stewart Sutherland, (CUP, 1982)
  • Christ, Ethics, and Tragedy: Essays in Honor of Donald MacKinnon, Ed. Kenneth Surin, (CUP, 1989)
  • Paul D. Murray, “Theology in the Borderlands: Donald MacKinnon and Contemporary Theology.” Modern Theology vol 14, no 3 (1998): 355-376.
  • Timothy Connor, The Kenotic Trajectory of the Church in Donald MacKinnon’s Theology, (T&T Clark, 2013).
  • André Mueller, Ph.D diss., University of Otago, [forthcoming intellectual biography of MacKinnon]

In defense of an irony

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Owen Chadwick has a remark about John Henry Newman that’s left a lasting impression on me, namely, “Newman was an intellectual who distrusted the intellect.” There’s something about this characterization I find highly suggestive. It works not only as a description of how Newman proceeded in theology, but also as a proposal for how much weight we should accord certain kinds of considerations in our theological deliberations today. If you’re curious about what it might look like to take this lesson from Newman to heart, I’d suggest you need not look any farther than the work of Nicholas Lash, himself a Newman scholar. (I’ve tried gesturing to this same point before here). We’d be misinterpreting Newman and Lash if we take them to be advocating for a species of anti-intellectualism, some sort of principled refusal to submit their work to the review of their peers. Quite to the contrary, both theologians are examples of exceptional intellects at work on their craft. What they’re actually engaged in is an effort to overturn reigning prejudices favoring the primacy of the intellect in our understanding of religion.

Fortunately Newman and Lash aren’t alone in this endeavor. We can number other theologians among their ranks. Consider the following passage from Kathryn Tanner:

in the early 1980s […] the main worries of both theologians and philosophers of religion were methodological in nature: to justify religious thought, either by showing how it met the usual standards of meaning, intelligibility and truth endorsed by other disciplines, or (the preferred tactic of Frei and Lindbeck) by showing, with an ironic display of academic rigor, why no such justification was necessary. (Shaping a Theological Mind, Ed. Darren Marks, Ashgate, 2008, 115)

Tanner notes the irony of the rigor Frei and Lindbeck had to exert in order to make the case that university-wide criteria of accountability would be misplaced in theology. Whatever Tanner’s evaluation of their efforts, I’d say Frei and Lindbeck were on the right track. Even when (maybe even especially when) one is setting out to delimit the vocation of humanity’s rational powers, one must do so as thoughtfully, intelligently, as one can, if the critique is to have any chance of sticking. After all, it’s no disservice to reason to apprehend the limits of the intellect’s competencies by way of reasoned appraisal.